

Security & Privacy by Design in the SDLC:

Why, When, How?



PRESENTER

Cat Easdon
Senior Privacy Engineer &
Team Captain

whoami

- Lead Dynatrace's Privacy Engineering team in close collaboration with our Product Security teams
- Outside of work: research and tech policy, trail running, hiking, skiing...
- Previously: hacking CPUs at TU Graz














Outline

- Why?
 - And what does 'by design' really mean?
- When?
- How?
 - Two case studies: technical privacy controls, scaling vulnerability management
- Q&A

Why?







Volkswagen 2024 data breach (coverage: 38C3, Der Spiegel)

Insecurity by design

- Spring API endpoint to retrieve heap dumps publicly exposed
 - Contained credentials for AWS account and IDP's client ID and client secret
 - Leaked data for 800 000 electric cars; precise location data for 460 000 of them
- Compromised credentials not revoked after responsible disclosure


Volkswagen 2024 data breach (coverage: 38C3, Der Spiegel)

Privacy violated by design - but it's ok, it's not 'sensitive' data (!!)

- No pseudonymization
- Geo-coordinates not truncated (10cm precision)
- EU eCall Regulation (2015): mandates microphones, GPS, and internet/cellular comms in cars

What?

What does 'by design' really mean?



What does 'by design' really mean?



1

Voluntary pledge to demonstrate progress in seven areas (US CISA)



2

Security is a core business requirement, **principles** implemented during design, **secure defaults** (US CISA)

Official Journal of the European Union

Article 25


Data protection by design and by default

3


Principles implemented during design and data processing, **private defaults** (GDPR)

What does 'by design' really mean?






Shifting risk from customers -> company




When?

Controls in the SDLC



Secure Development Lifecycle: Dynatrace Edition



How?


Case Study 1: Privacy Controls

(Ideal) Scope of Privacy Controls



Mapping Personal Data Flows

- Code-level annotations
- Per-system manifests
- Scanning
 - Code-level: Privado, Trustworks
 - Database and data warehouse level: assorted vendors ('data discovery')




```
system:
  - fides_key: demo_analytics_system
   name: Demo Analytics System
   description: A system used for analyzing customer behaviour.
   system_type: Service
   administrating_department: Engineering
    egress:
      - fides_key: another_demo_system
        type: system
        data_categories:
    ingress:
      - fides_key: yet_another_demo_system
        type: system
        data_categories:
   privacy_declarations:
      - name: Analyze customer behaviour for improvements.
        data_categories:
        data_use: improve.system
        data_subjects:
        egress:
                                            fides lang
        ingress:
```


Privacy Code Scanning with Semgrep



```
1 rules:
      - id: no-personal-data-in-logs
        languages:
          - java
        message: Personal data should not be output to logs
        mode: taint
        pattern-sources:
          - patterns:
              - metavariable-pattern:
10
                  metavariable: $PERSONAL_DATA
11
                  patterns:
12
                    - pattern-either:
13
                        # approximate location
14
                         - pattern-regex: (?i)(.*(?<!(capa|velo)))(city|country|continent)</pre>
15
                         # precise location
                        - pattern-regex: (?i)(.*(gps[^\\s/(;)#|,=!>]{0,2}(?:location|position)|user[^\\s/(;)#|,=!>]
16
    \{0,2\} location | latitude | longitude | geo [^\\s/(;)#|,=!>] \{0,2\} coordinates) | (latlng | latlon) (\b| [^g]))
17
18
                        - pattern-regex: (?i)(.*email)|(?:business|personal|work|contact)[^\\s/(;)#|,=!>]
    {0,2}email.*|.*email[^\\s/(;)#|,=!>]{0,2}(?:address|id)
19
              - pattern-either:
20
                  - pattern: $PERSONAL_DATA()
21
                  - pattern: $PERSONAL_DATA = ...
22
        pattern-sinks:
23
         - pattern: log.$LEVEL(...)
24
         - pattern: log. ... .log(...)
25
         - pattern: LOG.$LEVEL(...)
          - pattern: LOG. ... .log(...)
26
27
          - pattern: LOGGER.$LEVEL(...)
28
        severity: ERROR
```

Privacy Code Scanning with Semgrep






A Look Into The Future...

• Static code analysis

Code- and system-

annotations

level personal data



How?

Case Study 2: Scaling Vulnerability Management

Maturity level 0

- Vulnerabilities get discovered by accident ©
- Nobody feels responsible for them



Maturity level 1

- Somebody feels responsible for manually finding and handling vulnerabilities
- ...and is drowning in work trying to handle them
- The teams owning vulnerable codebases are rarely cooperative



Maturity level 2

- Automated scanning will solve all our problems 199 * *
- Owning teams have been coerced into gently reminded of the importance of prompt vuln handling






Maturity level 3


 Basic scan results are extended with context-specific insights to reduce false positives and speed up triage and prioritization





Maturity level 3+

Context-specific deduplication and automated triage



Triaging Step	Description	State	Previous Score	Increase	Current Score	Reasoning
***			~~~~		***	~~~~
check_client_sign_in_lo gs_3	Checks if there are client sign in logs for the attacker IP or actor	0	50	20	70	Score was increased by 20 due to no successful logins found.
:heck_suspicious_logs_ }	Checks if there were logs by the attacker IP on any stage.	•	70	20	90	Score was increased by 20 due to suspicious logs foun- by attacker IP.
:heck_sso_logs_2	Checks if there were successful logins by the attacker IP on any stage.	•	90	-20	70	Score was decreased by -20 due to no successful SSO login found by attacker IP.
	_					
Total Score		Determin	Determined Severity		Recommendation	
70		High		,	(Preview) Investigate Ticket	

But wait a second...

Finding vulnerabilities is only part of the story!


What have we missed so far?

Prevent

- Understand what you have where (software + data catalog)
- Secure defaults, a.k.a. paved roads, golden paths, guardrails -> prevent entire vuln classes
- Automated patching
- Security advocate / champion programs

Remediate

- Leadership buy-in
- Establish guidance for each vuln class, upskill devs
- Automate remediation monitoring





How to Kill Bug Classes with Secure Guardrails, Clint Gibler & Colleen Dai






Security Bot APP 11:00

You have been assigned a vulnerability ticket that has a Medium severity and needs a fix in production before 2024-04-20.

Within the next 24h, please triage and add a comment answering:

- Is there a potential customer impact?
- Is the affected application or service (publicly) accessible or directly used by customers?



Thanks for listening!

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